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Abstract 
In the wake of a seismic shift in international security since September 11, 2001, there has been 
little study or evaluation of the concept of Armenian national security.  The aftermath of the events 
of 9/11 and the ensuing U.S.-led global war on terror, however, have revealed a need for a 
comprehensive reexamination of Armenia’s concept of national security.  And as the traditional 
geopolitical landscape of the South Caucasus has weathered a series of significant changes, 
Armenia’s traditional concept of national security has failed to keep pace with the emergence of 
new threats and challenges. More specifically, although Armenia faces less of a threat from direct 
military aggression or invasion, the new post-9/11 realities of the region have fostered a new 
strategic environment, endowed with significant challenge but also substantial opportunity for 
Armenia.  This paper will attempt to sketch this new post-9/11 strategic environment and will seek 
to address the specific issues and influences of importance to Armenia, including the need for a new 
definition of the economics of national security.  Although this paper originates from a rather 
critical starting point, the purpose is to present a creative reevaluation of the concept of Armenian 
national security.  The goal is to enhance capacity-building with a focus on the fundamental 
components of national security, including defense, foreign policy, and the economics of security, 
in order to minimize risk and maximize opportunity for the Republic of Armenia. 
 
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily 
represent those of the Armenian International Policy Research Group. Working Papers describe 
research in progress by the author(s) and are published to elicit comments and to further debate. 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of this brief paper is to examine the current threat environment facing the 
Republic of Armenia and to focus on the concept of Armenian national security.   Section 
One provides an overview of national security, including current challenges, and 
addresses some fundamental deficiencies in both the process and policy of Armenia’s 
concept of national security.  This section closes with a proposal for a new social-centric 
approach to supplement Armenia’s traditional state-centered security.   
 
Section Two focuses on the shifts in the geopolitical environment and surveys a number 
of priority issues impacting Armenian national security, including the implications of the 
U.S.-Russian strategic relationship and U.S. military/NATO engagement in the region.  
This paper concludes with Section Three, which examines the two main imperatives 
driving Armenian national security, Nagorno Karabagh and Javakhk. 
 
The History of Armenian National Security 
 
A number of prominent historians have documented the development of Armenian 
national security.  Driven by its rich but troubled history, the fundamental concept of 
Armenian national security has been dominated by the most basic and essential mission: 
survival.  Throughout history, this mission has entailed a complex strategy of managing 
threats from a number of world and regional powers.  The sole driving force of this 
mission has been a priority of ensuring the physical survival of the Armenian nation.  
Although this mission of national security did not often stem from statehood, or even 
from sovereignty, the imperative of national survival forged a resilient nationalism. 
 
Throughout the Ottoman period, with its sporadic threat of pogrom and massacre that 
culminated in the 1915 Armenian Genocide, the Armenian perception of national security 
was equated with nothing more than outright survival.  With the birth of the first 
Republic of Armenia of 1918, this historically defensive concept of Armenian national 
security adopted new elements of state security and military strategy.  But the short 
duration of statehood that ended abruptly with the absorption of the first Armenian 
Republic into the Soviet Union halted the development of a mature national security.   
 
The Soviet Legacy 
 
Although the extension of security inherent in the Sovietization of the Armenian state 
met the primary need for survival, it also impeded the course of Armenian statehood and 
impaired the development of a more sophisticated concept of national security.  
Throughout the Soviet period, Armenia was confined within the definitive parameters of 
Soviet identity and policy.  The net effect of this period was one of stunted development 
and retarded growth.  This was also evident in the misdirection of national security 
during the Soviet period, with its inward focus on “enemies of the state,” rather than 
focusing outward for potential threats.  For the Soviet Union, as for other Communist or 
dictatorial regimes, such an inward focus of national security was necessary for 
  
maintaining security and stability.  Yet this resulted in an institutionalization of “regime 
security” over national security.     
 
Thus, the foundations for Armenian statehood and national security were seriously 
flawed by the inherent limitations of its legacy as a component of the Soviet system.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the emergence of a new, second Armenian 
state, there was no reservoir of experience and maturity to draw upon in preparation for 
the complex challenges facing an infant state abruptly awakening to the reality of the 
world in the last decade of the 20th century.  Moreover, its legacy as a Soviet state led to a 
rather incoherent combination of strategy and statecraft at times grossly ill-suited for 
prudent policy or national power.   
 
Yet Armenia was still able to withstand war and blockade, while even through the worst 
of the crisis adapting to an externally imposed isolation and achieving economic growth 
in only a few short years.  And in terms of military security, Armenia was able to emerge 
as the dominant force in the region.  But in the ten and half years since the ceasefire with 
Azerbaijan that essentially “froze” the Nagorno Karabagh conflict, there has been little 
adaptation to meet the changing nature of strategic threats and the geopolitical shifts that 
has so profoundly altered global security.  Moreover, and most worrisome, Armenia has 
yet to seriously confront the dynamic pace of change in global security, geopolitics and 
globalization.    
 
Defining Armenian National Security 
 
The analytical process of defining national security is one of the more basic obligations 
of a state.  The term national security is essentially a state’s mission to meet possible 
threats, both internal and external.  This state mission is comprised of three main pillars:  
 
(1) to protect its territorial integrity and state borders;  
(2) to provide security for its population; and  
(3) to preserve stability, in both political and economic terms.   
 
The challenge of national security, especially in today’s complex environment of 
multiplying threats, is to ensure that both the definition and defense of national security is 
a dynamic, not static, process of constant vigilance and preparation.   
 
For an infant state like Armenia, small in both size and population, national security 
holds an even greater role in influencing the formulation of domestic and foreign policy 
alike.  Faced with the demands of a long-standing trade and transport blockade by its 
neighbors to the East and West, as well as the constraints of an unresolved conflict over 
Nagorno Karabagh, Armenian national security is endowed with a significance well 
beyond the traditional nature of small state geopolitics.  Moreover, Armenia is subject to 
several broader challenges, ranging from shifting global and regional geopolitical 
competition to the emergence of a new transnational threat to the state-centered system of 
global security.   
  
Section I.  Challenges to Armenian National Security 
 
The Blockade of Armenia 
 
One of the more immediate challenges driving Armenian national security has been the 
blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey.  Although the term blockade usually refers 
to the maritime interdiction, interference and denial of trade and transport to a nation’s 
port and coastline, in the case of the blockade of Armenia, it has encompassed a total 
East-West closure of Armenian land borders with both Azerbaijan and Turkey.1  The 
blockade of Armenia was especially powerful as it included a full disruption of trade, 
transport and energy links, and its effects were magnified by the landlocked nature of the 
Armenian state. 
 
While the imposition of the blockade by Azerbaijan was a natural result of the conflict 
with Armenia over Nagorno Karabagh, its initial impact resulted in an immediate and 
devastating shortage of foodstuffs and basic commodities, an abrupt and severe energy 
crisis, and a period of isolation.  Armenia was forced to quickly adapt to the sanctions 
and strove to accommodate the social and economic demands of crisis by concentrating 
on its sole remaining external trade link northward through Georgia.  The structural 
effects, however, of such adaptation fostered a degree of mounting dependence on 
Georgian territory as its sole source for Russian energy and goods.  This dependence was 
quickly exploited by the Georgians as transit and tariff fees quickly exceeded normal 
market rates.  The second external trade route, consisting of a small border crossing point 
southward through Iran, was without the infrastructure necessary to provide an immediate 
alternative.  The long-closed border with Iran through the Soviet period, the nature of the 
Iranian market and political regime, as well as the “rogue” state status of Iran all 
complicated Armenia’s use of the Iranian option.      
 
Overall, the blockade of Armenia has long surpassed its utility.  Not only was Armenia 
able to adapt, it has achieved impressive rates of economic growth.  In some ways, the 
effect of the blockade actually unified the Armenian (and Karabagh) population.  This 
“siege mentality” also withstood internal divisions and enhanced outward unity far 
beyond that of its neighbors.  Although the structural effects of such an artificial 
economic situation tends to foster economic development that does not correspond with 
an economy’s natural comparative advantage or conform to a country’s normal direction 
of trade, the lasting impact of the blockade on the Armenian economy was far less than 
originally anticipated.  
 
Analyzing Turkish Strategy in Blockading Armenia    
 
The imposition of a blockade of Armenia by Turkey in April 1993 was a far more 
significant development.  Although the economic impact on Armenia of the closed border 
and the trade embargo was marginal, it was far more important in terms of international 
                                                 
1   The embargo and related sanctions of Armenia by Azerbaijan and Turkey meet the minimum threshold 
of the most recent interpretation of the term blockade under international law, which notes the applicability 
of blockade on both sea and land by citing “the actual investment of a port or place by a hostile force….”  
  
law and Armenian national security.  The Turkish blockade, although seemingly rooted in 
Turkey’s role as Azerbaijan’s strategic ally, offered its own threat to Armenian national 
security well beyond the framework of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict or its relations 
with Azerbaijan.  In fact, the Turkish role in the twin blockade of Armenia was driven as 
much by its pursuit of regional power as by its support for Azerbaijan. 
 
The Turkish strategy underpinning the blockade of Armenia is far more complex than 
commonly accepted.  Since its recognition of Armenian independence in January 1992, 
Turkish policy regarding Armenia has been one of intimidation and coercion.  To this 
day, Turkey refuses to establish diplomatic relations with Armenia and has consistently 
exerted pressure on its vulnerable Armenian neighbor.  The Turkish strategy has been 
driven by a perception of Armenia verging on paranoia, wildly overreacting to every 
mention of the Armenian Genocide and maintaining a stubborn campaign of historical 
revisionism both within Turkey and throughout the West.  In contrast, Armenia has 
offered to enter relations with no preconditions.    
 
But there is more to the Turkish blockade than the historical factor, however.  The 
blockade has also offered Turkey a tool for garnering greater regional dominance, a goal 
especially important from the Turkish perspective given the reassertion of Russian power 
in the region.  And aside from cementing relations with its dependent ally Azerbaijan, the 
blockade supports its broader effort to intimidate and influence its neighbors.  Not unlike 
the efforts of both Russia and Iran in leveraging energy for strategic influence and control 
over weaker states, Turkey also utilizes the energy sector as an important vehicle for 
exercising key strategic power in the region.  The energy sector, in terms of exploration 
and export, is the most obvious element in the long-term development of the South 
Caucasus.  At the same time, however, the promise of energy is also the region's most 
obvious vulnerability.  Thus, the Turkish blockade of Armenia should be seen as a part of 
a broader regional strategy that also includes both the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline and the 
“Blue Stream” natural gas project with Russia.   
 
The Turkish strategy of leveraging energy for regional power consists of several levels.  
First, by seeking to exploit its own position as regional proxy for the United States, and to 
a lesser degree, for Europe, Turkey pursues a policy positioning itself as a reliable 
alternative to dependence on Russia or Iran as a main export route.  The logic of this plan 
establishes the supremacy of geopolitics over economics, however, by stressing the 
importance to exclude any Russian or Iranian role in the transport of Caspian energy and 
ignoring the overwhelming commercial case against this cost-ineffective option.   
 
The second factor of Turkish strategy consists of its role in the development of the 
region’s natural gas.  The natural gas sector offers Turkey a broader role in meeting its 
own domestic energy needs and overcoming its chronic gas shortages.  Turkish strategy 
on this level focuses on the construction of a natural gas pipeline from the energy-rich 
Central Asian country of Turkmenistan, under the Caspian Sea, and on through 
Azerbaijan and Georgia, with a final destination in Turkey.  This plan would allow 
Turkey to purchase roughly half of the natural gas exports entering Turkish facilities 
through this pipeline, while exporting the remaining energy to nearby Europe. 
  
 
The third component of this strategy rests on the pillar of isolation.  By specifically 
excluding Armenia from all energy plans, Turkey seeks to isolate the small landlocked 
and energy-dependent country.  And this is where the joint Turkish-Azerbaijani blockade 
assumes strategic clarity.  Considerations of Turkish geography have contributed to each 
of these factors, with the most obvious seen in the pursuit of control over the Bosporus, 
the narrow straits that connect the Black Sea to the Mediterranean.  By utilizing control 
over these straits, Turkey exercises dominance over the weakest link in the Russian 
regional energy network.  Faced with a reliance on the Bosporus for transporting its 
energy exports from its Black Sea ports, Russian tanker traffic is particularly prone to 
Turkish manipulation of this naval bottleneck.  Turkey has exerted this defensive factor 
on several occasions, issuing threats to limit or even halt traffic through the Bosporus.  
Although untenable in terms of international law (the Treaty of Montreaux stipulates free 
passage through the Bosphorus at all times except during war), Turkey has been creative 
in arguing that tanker traffic poses grave environmental risks.    
 
In addition to this overall multifaceted regional strategy, Turkish policies in the South 
Caucasus also follow a subset of tactical impulses.  These tactical impulses consist of 
narrower bilateral policies toward the regional states, each supplementing its broader 
strategy.  These tactical policies also reflect the same strategic agenda of achieving 
Turkish dominance and fostering greater dependence among its weaker neighbors.  The 
most obvious examples of this trend are Turkey’s policies of military assistance to 
Georgia and Azerbaijan and its complicated covert relationship with the Chechens.    
 
Blockade as an “Act of War” 
 
But the most significant aspect of Turkey’s blockade of Armenia stems from the impact 
on Armenian national security.  Coupled with its history of military expansion and 
aggression, most notable in its continued military occupation of the Republic of Cyprus, 
Turkey is guilty of several violations of international law, the United Nations Charter, 
UN treaties and resolutions and the mandates of both the European Union (EU) and the 
World Trade Organization (WTO).  In terms of international law, the blockade of 
Armenia is essentially an “act of war.” 2   
 
It is this belligerency and the destabilizing effect of Turkish strategy that defines Turkey 
as the most significant obstacle to regional stability and security.  But more recent 
developments offer some promise that the traditional Turkish threat will be contained or 
even transformed by a larger strategic desire to join the European Union (EU).  The EU 
offer of a long process of ascension greatly constrains Turkey to submit itself to a set of 
standards and requirements.  Although still subject to shifts in European politics and 
differing EU state relations with Turkey, this process effectively places Turkey in a 
“straightjacket” of conformity and constraint.  Thus, Turkish ascension to the EU is in 
accordance with Armenia’s longer-term national interest.     
 
                                                 
2   Robertson, Horace, 1991, “Specific Means and Methods of Application of Force,” Duke Journal of 
Comparative and International Law, Vol. 1 No. 1.   
  
Energy Security 
 
A second immediate challenge that drives Armenian national security is energy security.  
The recognition of energy as a global security concern first arose in the wake of the 
OPEC oil embargo of 1973.  One of the more astute observers of this situation, Michael 
Klare, has regularly warned of the dangers posed by a disregard for energy security.  
According to Klare (2001), the future course of conflict in this new post-Cold War era 
will be driven in large part by conflicts over natural resources, exacerbated by an already 
steady trend toward the militarization and securitization of energy resources. 3  
 
Armenia’s vulnerability to disruptions in energy supplies was most clearly demonstrated 
during the initial stages of the blockade imposed by Azerbaijan and Turkey, when energy 
consumption fell by 90 percent.  Although the Soviet network of pipelines and energy 
links was designed to foster interdependence on the center by the republics along the 
periphery of the Soviet Union, the core Armenian vulnerability and energy insecurity is 
due to its serious lack of natural resources and dependence on foreign energy sources.  It 
is this structural dependence that has elevated the strategic necessity of operating the 
country’s Medzamor nuclear power plant and has spurred the development of 
hydroelectricity.   
 
Ironically, the Armenian government has only tended to forge a deepening of energy 
dependence in recent years.  Specifically, Armenia’s recent “asset-for-debts” agreements 
with Russia in 2002 and 2003 ceded control over key strategic enterprises and core 
components of the energy sector to Russian control.  Overall, the agreements resulted in 
the consolidation of Russian dominance over the country and allowed Russia to secure, 
with the assent of an overly compliant Armenian government, control or outright 
ownership of much of the country’s energy network, including its hydroelectric plants 
and its sole nuclear power plant.   
 
As a country vulnerable to isolation, Armenia shares much in common with Japan, as 
both have a serious degree dependence on foreign sources of oil that is offset by a pursuit 
of energy diversification as an essential component of national security.  With Armenia’s 
isolation compounded by its landlocked borders and Japan’s by the oceans surrounding 
its islands, both nations are among the world’s most obvious hostages to the demands of 
geography and the constraints of a limited resource base.   
 
The key difference between the two nations, however, is one of energy demand.  
Armenia is still a relatively small energy consumer and is, therefore, faced with a less 
profound need to achieve greater energy independence.  But although Armenia may be 
able to potentially garner a higher degree of energy diversification than Japan, it can 
neither afford nor obtain consistent energy supplies while being excluded from regional 
energy development.  The real lesson is that Armenian national security must incorporate 
elements of energy security in its pursuit of national security.  
 
                                                 
3   See Michael Klare, 2001, Resource Wars.  The New Landscape of Global Conflict (New York: 
Metropolitan Books).  
  
The need for energy diversification is most evident in Armenia’s dependence on natural 
gas.  Accounting for roughly half of Armenian total energy consumption, natural gas has 
traditionally come from Russian and Turkmen producers.  An agreement reached in 2003, 
however, established the Russian state-owned natural gas monopoly Gazprom as the 
country’s predominant supplier.  To the credit of Armenian leaders, there has been a 
renewed effort to diversify the sources of natural gas, through the planned construction of 
a 90-mile natural gas pipeline with neighboring Iran.   
 
Although the project was subject to repeated delay for the past decade, the construction 
of the Armenian section of the pipeline began in late November 2004.  The $30 million 
project, connecting Megri in southern Armenia to Kajaran in Iran, would provide 
Armenia with 38 billion cubic feet of Iranian gas annually, with plans to double this 
amount by 2019.  In addition to providing Armenia with gas supplies from Iran outside of 
the Caspian export network, the new pipeline would also allow for the import of natural 
gas from Turkmenistan.             
 
A Strategic Petroleum Reserve 
 
An interesting option for lessening Armenia’s vulnerability to external energy shocks 
may be the establishment of a secure petroleum reserve.  Such an option is especially 
important in the event of a disruption of energy supplies from Russia or Turkmenistan, as 
well as in the event of a possible renewed war with Azerbaijan.  The role of strategic 
petroleum reserves in energy security has long been recognized as a crucial step to 
protect against the effects of unexpected shortages or disruptions of energy supplies.  But 
adequate stockpiles have been difficult to create and maintain, as the most vulnerable 
import-dependent economies are most often unable to handle the prohibitive cost.   
 
In the case of the United States, for example, as the world’s largest oil importer, it 
established a Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in 1975 to help prevent a repetition of 
the economic dislocation caused by the 1973-74 Arab oil embargoes.  As an important 
element in U.S. energy security, the mere existence of a large, operational reserve of 
crude oil was seen as an effective way to deter future oil cutoffs and discourage the use of 
oil as a weapon.  In the event of an interruption, the release of oil from the reserve is 
expected to help calm markets, mitigate sharp price spikes, and reduce the economic 
dislocation that had accompanied the 1973 disruption.  It is believed that the reserve 
would buy precious time for the crisis to sort itself out or for diplomacy to seek some 
resolution before a potentially severe oil shortage escalated a crisis beyond control. 
 
The New Threat Matrix 
 
In this post-post-Cold War period, there are three new types of threats, each presenting 
their own specific and unique challenges that transcend the parameters of traditional 
threats posed by nation states.  First, the emergence of al Qaeda and the attacks of 9/11 
demonstrated the potency of newer security threats posed by non-state actors, such as 
transnational terrorist groups, and from the related dangers of weak or “failed states” as 
havens for terrorists.  The post-9/11 threat matrix also coincides with the emergence of a 
  
second threat, from the pace of globalization, a trend that was well underway throughout 
the last decade.  The trend of globalization comprises its own form of security threats, 
with the most pertinent stemming from the threat of isolation.  The third new threat, 
unlike the first two, originates from within the state itself.  This internal threat is one of 
governance, and involves the need for economic or “social” security, as well as the 
necessity for democracy and good governance. 
 
The Transnational Threat 
 
The new set of transnational threats that has emerged in recent years poses a daunting 
challenge.  It is one thing to combat the traditional military threats posed by an adversary 
or potential aggressor, but preparations for threats of a transnational nature require new 
thinking and newer methods.  The demands from such transnational threats also strain the 
resources and capabilities of most states, even the most industrialized and developed.  
But for small states like Armenia, vulnerability and a lack of preparedness for 
transnational threats are in many ways even more pronounced.   
 
The most obvious transnational threat in the post-9/11 world is international terrorism 
and, most spectacularly the globalized al Qaeda network.  Yet Armenia has already been 
touched by other less sensational threats of a transnational nature.  These include 
narcotics and arms trafficking, and international organized crime.  But most importantly, 
Armenia is generally unprepared for two other types of transnational threats, both of 
which pose unique dangers resulting from the intersection of threat and globalization. 
 
First, there is a serious threat of a public health nature, comparable to the threat of AIDS, 
but on a smaller scale.  Multiplied by the networks and connectivity of globalization, the 
threat of epidemic has reached alarming proportions in recent years, with the outbreak of 
SARS 4 in Asia and “Mad Cow” disease in Europe and North America being the most 
recent.  Second, the recent tsunami in South Asia underscores the need for preparedness 
for natural disaster.  The suffering from the Armenian earthquake, and the still 
incomplete task of rebuilding, are painful reminders of the power of natural disaster.  
Such tragedy inflicts substantial damage, in both human and material terms, and it is 
usually not until such disasters occur that they are recognized as threats to national 
security.  A related long-term issue is environmental security, which for Armenia is 
evident in the country’s troubled state of its natural resources (as with deforestation, 
pollution, the declining water table of Lake Sevan, etc).  Environmental security is also 
important on a regional scale, as seen in the case of the new Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline’s 
threat to the ecology of Southern Georgia.     
 
The Threat of Failed & Fragile States 
 
A second element in this new threat matrix is the strategic “failed” or “fragile” state 
scenario, a condition defined by weakened state sovereignty and an erosion of authority 
marked by a structural imbalance of power between the central authorities and outlying 
regions.  In the case of Georgia, for example, the power competencies of the central 
                                                 
4   SARS stands for sever acute respiratory syndrome. 
  
government have been substantially reduced with a marked failure to enforce power and 
authority over much of the national territory.  
 
The danger of such a vacuum in the case of these failed or fragile states was most evident 
in the case of Afghanistan.  It was the failed state condition of Afghanistan during and 
after its devastating civil war that allowed the emergence of the Taliban regime and 
offered the Bin Laden al Qaeda organization an attractive logistical base.  Most 
significantly, it was the nature of Afghanistan as a failed state that allowed the Al Qaeda 
network to transform Afghanistan into a “hijacked state.”  A similar, albeit less effective, 
situation allowed the Bin Laden organization to secure refuge and forge an operational 
capacity in Sudan as well.  
 
In sharp contrast to British diplomat Robert Cooper's theory of a “post-modern” world 
characterized by the paradigm of a near border-less globalization, September 11th has 
highlighted the threats emanating from more primitive models.  These more primitive 
models, as German diplomat Heinrich Kreft has recently defined as “pre-modern” 
outposts, were evident in the cases of the Taliban in Afghanistan and Hezbollah in 
Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.  And as Kreft has further elaborated in an essay published in a 
journal of the German Council on Foreign Relations, “post-modern Europe and the 
modern U.S. and their allies must intensify efforts to resolve conflicts in the “pre-
modern” world of failed and hijacked states.”5  It is from this perspective that current 
U.S. efforts underway in the “pre-modern” states in many far-flung regions with little or 
no obvious connection to U.S. national interest can best be understood. 
 
From the Armenian perspective, the threat of new “failed” states, such as in the troubled 
North Caucasus, or the decline of “failing” states, as in neighboring Georgia, is a very 
realistic possibility.  Given the dangers of renewed disruption to Armenian trade and 
energy links through Georgia, as well as the risk of conflict spillover from Chechnya, this 
aspect of a new threat matrix merits greater appreciation.  
 
 
The Threat of Isolation 
 
The third element in this new threat matrix facing Armenia is the danger of isolation.  
This threat involves the danger of becoming isolated and disconnected from the 
globalized marketplace.  This threat is rooted in the economics of isolation, and is a 
shared threat throughout the region that involves a need to keep pace with technological 
and economic changes inherent in the process of globalization.  Although from a regional 
perspective, Armenia benefits from increasing rates of foreign investment that are not 
resource-based like Azerbaijan nor aid-driven as with Georgia, but are attracted by the 
openness and opportunity offered by the Armenian economy.  The Armenian IT sector 
holds another important advantage over its neighbors and demonstrates the necessity for 
interoperability with global markets and knowledge-based development.    
 
                                                 
5    Kreft, Heinrich, 2001, “Dealing with 'Pre-Modern States,” Transatlantic Internationale Politik, Volume 
2, Number 4, 5.   
  
In terms of global security it is now accepted that “national security depends less and less 
on territory and natural resources and more and more on the ability to adapt and integrate 
into the global economy.” 6  And for a country like Armenia faced with traditional limits 
of demography and geography, “economic issues are increasingly linked to security.” 7  
Yet this recognition has yet to be embraced by Armenian national security, as the current 
confines of Armenian nationalism have as yet failed to expand to include the demands of 
“economic security.”   
 
 
The Political Economy of National Security 
 
Armenia faces several new internal developments that compound the need to reexamine 
its concept of national security.  These internal challenges, in many ways the hardest to 
overcome, range from a worrisome trend in authoritarianism and a widening deficit of 
democracy, to an erosion of self-sufficiency and independence stemming from a 
dangerous over-reliance on Russia. As previously argued, the most serious threat to 
Armenian national security comes not from Azerbaijan, nor Turkey, but comes from 
within.  It is posed by the internal threat of corruption and all of its derivatives, from the 
rise of the powerful oligarchs to a “rule of law” that has degenerated into a “law of the 
rulers.”   
 
The real threat to Armenian democracy is most clearly demonstrated by the tendency for 
governance by strong individual leaders over strong institutional leadership.  This 
dominance of “strongmen over statesmen” has emerged as one of the most formidable 
obstacles to conflict resolution and regional reintegration.  The challenges of a mounting 
social divide, marked by widening disparities in wealth and income constitute “economic 
security.”  These economic and social components of national security, exacerbated by a 
cancer of corruption, constitute a threat to Armenia’s internal stability and security that 
has been ignored for far too long.      
 
The nature of a country’s political and economic development, or more specifically, the 
depth of its democracy or free markets, has also become a new factor in the assessment 
and evaluation of a country’s place within the international community.  While of course 
not universally accepted, this new criteria is now key to the Bush Administration’s 
interpretation of U.S. foreign relations.  This new mandate for the promotion, if not 
imposition, of free market democracy abroad now serves as a core element in a more 
muscular and, at times, unilateral U.S. foreign policy.  This is further expressed within 
U.S. national security as an avenue toward addressing the root causes of international 
terrorism and instability, arguing that a lack of democracy and a closed economy 
produces deep discontent and despair, thereby providing a classic breeding ground for 
terrorism.     
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In practice, the promotion of democracy and free markets is further justified by the U.S. 
argument that “repressive regimes and nonperforming economies can indirectly feed into 
transnational terrorism, while an open economy that is supported by institutions and 
backed by enforceable rules tends to increase the welfare of most citizens.”8  But there is 
an obvious problem with this approach, as there is an already apparent discrepancy in its 
application (most evident in the U.S. partnerships with Uzbekistan and Pakistan, for 
example).   
 
A related problem is rooted in the application of such a strategy.  For example, in the case 
of a country like Algeria, democracy meant the election of an Islamist party.  The 
question then becomes what if democracy results in the election of a radically anti-
American or anti-Western (i.e. Islamist in American eyes) government?  As raised by 
Carothers (2002) and Zakaria (1997), free and fair elections, therefore, do not by 
themselves ensure deep democratization, only the veneer of superficial democracy. 9
 
But the relevance for Armenia is much more specific.  The standard of democracy has 
acquired a new significance in the past two years alone, and has now emerged as a 
determining factor in the regime stability and geopolitics of such countries as Georgia 
and Ukraine.  The electoral trigger that sparked “regime change” in both Georgia and 
now Ukraine was as much by design as by default, and the lessons of the “Rose” and 
“Orange” revolutions should not be lost on Armenia.  Moreover, the significance also lies 
in the need to exploit Armenia’s comparative advantage of democracy and economics 
within the region.  Despite the serious problems and deficiencies with Armenian politics, 
there is, nevertheless, a widening “democracy divide” between pluralist Armenia and its 
more autocratic Azerbaijani neighbor.  And although there is a troubling need to bolster 
the institutions of Armenia’s infant democracy and address the serious social inequalities, 
this advantage should not only be highlighted, but must also be exploited. 
 
 
Reevaluating Armenian National Security 
 
In the new geopolitical landscape that has redefined the South Caucasus and Central Asia 
in the wake of September 11th, the authoritarian regimes generally preferred as more 
effective partners in the war on terror’s military operations must not be granted pardons 
from the standards of democracy and the rule of law.  The challenge now is to ensure that 
these new partners in the “war on terrorism” are not permitted to leverage Western needs 
for their military assets and security cooperation for a disregard of their deficits in 
democracy and poor human rights.  And for small vulnerable countries like Armenia, the 
implications of its strategic relations with regional and world powers must certainly be 
more fully considered, and its political role models must be truly worthy of emulation 
and replication.                 
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The Need for a Process of National Security 
 
Although there are obvious limitations of resources, both human and financial, to the 
development of a more sophisticated and comprehensive Armenian strategy of national 
security, there are some key points for consideration.  The core mission, however, is to 
establish a coherent process of national security.  This entails both organizational and 
ideological reforms, including a reexamination of commonly held but little questioned 
tenets of Armenian national security. 
 
For example, the U.S. model of national security planning and formulation offers an 
important precedent for Armenia mainly because it elevates the national security process 
to a level of equal significance with national security policy.  During the initial stage of 
the Cold War, the executive branch of the U.S. government first instituted the practice of 
publicly disclosing an articulated concept of national security.  In 1947 American 
strategist George Kennan published the most significant interpretation of U.S. national 
security with an article in the journal Foreign Affairs.  Writing under a pseudonym, 
Kennan laid out a broad strategy for managing the threat posed by the Soviet Union.  His 
concept of “containment” quickly became the centerpiece of U.S. national security 
throughout the Cold War and was then codified by the Truman Administration in 
National Security Council Document 68 (NSC-68).   
 
The practice of an annual reporting of U.S. national security was not instituted until the 
Nixon Administration, however.  The process was later enacted into law by the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, requiring every 
Administration to submit an annual report on its national security strategy to Congress.  
This practice is more than a display of the transparency of U.S. governance, but as a legal 
requirement, forces the Administration to formulate and articulate a coherent concept of 
its national security goals and perspectives.  Thus, it is the process more than the policy 
of national security that is enhanced by this system.  
 
The most glaring deficiency in the current institutions of Armenian national security is 
their absence.  With Defense Minister Serzh Sarkisian heading the Armenian National 
Security Council as its secretary, the body has met infrequently and, aside from the active 
involvement of its chief, has been largely marginalized from the formulation and 
considerations of the national security decision-making process.  Although there has been 
a marked increase in the role of parliamentary committees with jurisdiction over defense 
and security policy, the sheer dominance of the executive branch in general, and the 
defense minister in particular, means that the dysfunctional nature of the national security 
process remains uncorrected. 
 
One basic recommendation to improve the process of Armenian national security would 
be to reform the organization of the National Security Council.  Currently, the Armenian 
National Security Council is rarely convened as a full consultative body and, even when 
it meets, is usually focused on the implementation of a decision already adopted.  This 
distorted process stems from the fact that the body is headed by the powerful Defense 
Mister, Serzh Sarkisian, as the official Secretary of the National Security Council.  Given 
  
the Defense Minister’s dominant role over much of the country’s military and security 
policies and decisions, the practical result renders the body to be organizationally 
impotent.   
 
Structurally, the specific role of the Defense Minster also reveals an obvious conflict of 
interest.  The conflict is natural, as a government minister is empowered to represent the 
interests of a particular ministry, and such vested interests would only interfere or 
obstruct the minister’s additional responsibility as the head of the National Security 
Council.  A related conflict stems from the Defense Minister’s role as the head of the 
inter-governmental commission for bilateral relations with Russia.  There should be an 
obvious delineation of roles and responsibilities between positions that hold jurisdiction 
over such intertwined aspects of national security.   
 
For a practical example, in the event of the National Security Council’s reconsideration 
of Armenian-Russian relations, or the examination of issues related to the “assets-for-
debt” deals with Russia, the fact that the head of the body is simultaneous serving as the 
Defense Minister and the head of the state commission empowered to oversee the issue at 
hand, there can be little real expectation of objective consideration.  Although by virtue 
of the position, the Defense Minister automatically merits membership in the body, the 
National Security Council must be headed by a Secretary immune from such conflicts of 
interest, whether real or perceived.  
 
There is an additional constraint on the Armenian national security process.  This second 
obstacle is neither organizational nor institutional, but is rooted in the state of Armenian 
politics.  The hardening of Armenian political thinking in recent years, or more 
accurately the increasing rigidity of Armenian nationalist posturing, has fostered a closed 
system of politics that has expanded to influence both the national security and defense 
policy processes.   
 
This trend of vocal and strident nationalism is rooted in a pattern of domestic politics, 
serving political interests.  In a negative sense, there is a degree of “identity politics” at 
work, with a crude, yet effective manipulation of public opinion by a well-entrenched 
elite.  As one scholar has described, “it is more accurate to say that statesmen and 
societies actively shape the lessons of the past in ways they find convenient than it is to 
say that they are shaped by them.” 10     
 
This is most evident in the national position on the Nagorno Karabagh conflict and can be 
seen in the discourse regarding the Armenian-held areas of Azerbaijani territory beyond 
the borders of Karabagh.  Despite their initial seizure as tactical bargaining chips in later 
negotiations, the position on these areas have surpassed even their strategic purpose as 
“buffer zones” against any future Azerbaijani military aggression.   
 
The point here is not to casually discard the tenets of Armenian nationalism, however.  
The issue is to draw attention to the danger of misunderstanding the nature of the threat.  
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This danger of “threat misperception” that results from a rigid nationalism has been 
compounded by the closed and subjective nature of national security and defense policy-
making.  The overwhelming need, therefore, is to institute a process of national security 
and defense that elevates Armenia’s true national interest over more parochial partisan 
interest.        
 
Rethinking Armenian Military Strategy 
 
Just as the current state of Armenian national security is the product of a unique 
combination of a Soviet legacy, almost a decade and a half of difficult statehood so 
serious that it threatened national survival, and a number of domestic political influences, 
Armenian military policy has been shaped by a similar set of influences.  As with the 
European experience, the Armenian military holds an essential role in state-building.  
More than most countries, the Armenian military is more than a fundamental pillar of the 
state, it is also a foundational agent of the state. 
 
The domestic aspect of the Armenian military, however, also raises some concerns.  The 
concern is not the traditional worry of distorted civil-military relations, as there is no 
current danger of the Armenian military from disregarding its role as protector of the 
state and defender of the constitution.  The concern rests with the country’s civilian-
military relations.  More specifically, the civilian choices in Armenian defense policy 
reflect fears about the distribution of power within the state more than they reflect the 
military needs of the state.  As some scholars have established, “military doctrine is about 
state survival, but military policy is also about the allocation of power within society.” 11  
 
Assessing the Armenian Armed Forces 
 
The Armenian armed forces are a mixed professional, contract and conscript-based 
organization, consisting of two services: ground forces and joint air force and air defence 
forces.  The Army is the heart of the Armenian armed forces and is the largest of the 
services, with more than 75 per cent of both the active military personnel and equipment.  
The Army is organized into five Corps Headquarters and the principal ground combat 
formations are the motorized rifle regiment and brigade, with the former Soviet army 
headquarters and divisions reorganized into a more manageable-sized combat formation.   
 
The joint air/air defence forces are composed of a combination of combat assets that is 
capable of only nominally supporting offensive and defensive air operations, as it is 
structured on a mix of old, generally poorly maintained airframes and a small number of 
operational aircraft.  The air element is organized into four functional commands: a 
fighter ground attack squadron; a transport unit; a composite helicopter squadron; and a 
training centre.  The various air force units are built around a mix of aircraft types, 
including Mi-24 (attack helicopters), Mi-8/17 (support helicopters), Su-25 (close air 
support), MiG-25 (reconnaissance, fighter and fighter-bomber) and L-29 (armed trainers).  
The air defence elements comprise composite fighter/ground attack unit that incorporate 
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the limited counter-air, offensive air and air defence capabilities, surface-to-air 
gun/missile units, and air defence surveillance radar units.   
 
Initially, much of the equipment and command and control systems were taken over from 
the former Soviet 19th Independent Air Defence Army, but the capabilities of these 
surveillance and command and control systems have been significantly improved over 
the years by Russia to enhance the capabilities of the CIS air defence network.  The core 
of Armenia’s national air defence is the Russian-operated joint air defence command 
center outside of Yerevan, which is integrated into the Russian and CIS air defence 
networks.  Air defense is further bolstered by a sole squadron of current generation 
Russian Air Force fighters (MiG-29s) and a battalion of Russian ground-based strategic 
air defence systems (SA-12s) that are stationed in Armenia. 
 
The overall assessment of the Armenian armed forces continues to be very favorable, 
rated as the strongest army in the Caucasus, and unit-for-unit possibly in the CIS.  Unlike 
its neighbors, Armenia is no longer dependent on a deteriorating Soviet legacy equipment 
set to support its ground combat capabilities.  Since independence, Russia has replaced 
much of the older ground force systems, maintained a flow of necessary spare parts and 
provided technical assistance to support the maintenance of equipment and the training of 
technicians. 
   
The Armenian military is essentially a single service force, with only a nominal air 
component of its own, and with little combined arms operational capability.  Although 
the Army remains superior to its neighbors and can effectively defend its territory as well 
as Nagorno Karabagh, without an effective air component, the force has only limited 
offensive capability against a comparable force with an air component and will be 
constrained in movement by its air defence umbrella.  Although this is a very 
professional and highly rated military, it does not yet have the battle-space awareness, the 
extended reach, or the operational flexibility inherent in most modern, combined arms 
militaries. 
 
Assessing the Karabagh Military 
 
The armed forces of Nagorno Karabagh, although supported economically and 
logistically by Armenia, have a degree of self-sufficiency and significant, small-force 
capability.  Karabagh’s armed forces are relatively well organized, equipped, trained and 
led.  Its combat systems are generally well maintained and there is a high degree of 
operational readiness.  
 
At the height of the conflict with the much larger Azerbaijani armed forces, the Karabagh 
armed forces became rapidly seasoned in defensive warfare, developing and enhancing 
its native capabilities as mountain troops skilled in guerrilla warfare techniques.  These 
special operations capabilities were combined with impressive unit mobility.  Extremely 
well armed, these mobile units specialized in traditional special operational warfare, with 
quick confrontations utilizing overwhelming firepower.  Large campaign and engaged 
  
were launched only rarely, as the Karabagh forces prudently relied on their operational 
and tactical advantages of mobility and fast attack. 
 
As the military conflict with Azerbaijan turned to their advantage, the Karabagh forces 
were able to greatly expand their range and zone of engagement by forming a virtual 
“buffer zone” of demilitarized territory beyond the traditional borders of Nagorno 
Karabagh, thereby effectively marginalizing the Azerbaijani numerical advantage in 
infantry and artillery.  Karabagh anti-aircraft defenses, utilizing surface-to-air missiles 
(SAMs) and other similar ground-launched weapons, inflicted a heavy toll and tempered 
Azerbaijan’s air superiority in the early stages of the conflict.  The mountainous terrain 
and related climate in Karabagh were also detrimental to any effective air campaign and 
demonstrated the situational awareness and operational command of the Karabagh forces. 
     
The other significant advantage the Karabagh forces is the quality of its officer corps and 
strategic leadership.  During the conflict, the clear majority of the Karabakh officer corps 
included seasoned and well-decorated veterans of the Soviet military, many with 
significant combat experience in Afghanistan that was applied in specific operations. 
 
An Outdated Military Doctrine 
 
The fundamental flaw in Armenian military policy is its reliance on an outdated and quite 
inappropriate military doctrine.  Armenian’s Soviet legacy and the respected experience 
of Armenian officers within the Soviet military establishment provided a useful 
advantage during the early formation of the Armenian armed forces and contributed 
greatly to the shift from defeat to victory in the conflict with Azerbaijan.  But the 
continued reliance on an essentially Soviet military doctrine is a serious impediment to 
the further development of a modern military capable of defending the Armenian nation. 
 
The Soviet military doctrine is driven by two strategic concepts: “defense in depth” and 
“war by attrition.”  Defense in depth is a defensive move commonly practiced by large 
states that utilizes a vast expanse of territory to lure the enemy to over-extend its supply 
lines, thereby exposing a vulnerability to counter-attack.  The second concept of war by 
attrition is a related strategy that exploits the leverage of greater manpower and a deeper 
resource base.  Both strategies are essentially defensive in the initial stage but transform 
into powerful offensive tactics once the opponent commits its forces.  Both are concepts 
that force the enemy to wage war on terms chosen by the defender and exploit the 
defender’s greater “situational awareness.”  These concepts served Russia and the Soviet 
Union well as keys to eventual victory against the armies of both Napoleon and Hitler.  
The Russian military of today still adheres to the basic fundamentals of these doctrines 
and even the recent efforts of Russian military reform have failed to move far from the 
limits of these concepts. 
 
For a small country like Armenia, however, the constraints of both territory and 
demography render such doctrine totally inappropriate and, in the face of an actual 
invasion or full scale war, would be fatal.  The reality of the Armenian state, both in 
terms of topography and territorial size, necessitates a military doctrine more suited to the 
  
imperatives of a small country.  This would suggest a military doctrine similar to a state 
like Israel, with an emphasis on highly mobile, rapid reaction forces able to respond to 
border incursions with overwhelming firepower.  This would be supplemented by a 
powerful air deterrent, making air superiority essential in the initial stages of any thrust, 
and the deployment of Special Operations Forces (SOF).   
 
Although the use of armor would be impeded by the mountainous terrain beyond the 
Ararat valley, the concept of armor warfare, as a tactical application of rapid, integrated 
and overwhelming firepower to check an aggressor in the immediate phase of attack, 
provides relevant lessons on Armenian strategy, however.  Additional elements would 
include an effective command and control (C3) network, fed by real-time intelligence and 
surveillance. 
 
An Atrophy of Military Capabilities 
 
The conflict with Azerbaijan, despite the severity of both combat and casualty, was a 
limited war that was generally limited to a struggle for control of Nagorno Karabagh and, 
aside from limited operational combat along the Armenian border with Nakhichevan, did 
not penetrate the Republic of Armenia in any significant way.  The May 1994 ceasefire 
that effectively “froze” the conflict marked the emergence of an impressive Armenian 
military capability, with combat readiness and operational superiority over its much 
larger opponent.  The Armenian military advantage, as with all states, is not a static 
achievement, however.   
 
Military readiness and capabilities must be routinely enhanced by training and, where 
possible, through deployment.  In order to maintain its operational advantage, the 
Armenian Defense Ministry has instituted a comprehensive program of training, 
deployment and advanced education.  This program has been matched by a consistent 
trend of increased budget appropriations for the armed forces, with the most recent 
increases in defense spending going toward improvements in the quality of life and pay 
for soldiers.   
 
The Armenian ground forces in particular have garnered significant peacekeeping 
experience, with a deployment to Kosovo under Greek command.  A small contingent of 
under fifty army personnel are also set to be deployed to Iraq, to serve as part of a Polish-
led multinational force.  Armenia also sends a small, but elite number of selected officers 
and soldiers to study in foreign military academies and institutions.  To date, Armenian 
members of the armed forces have graduated from training and educational courses in 
Russian, Greek, Italian, U.S. and even Chinese military colleges and facilities.  Such 
international experience is invaluable for the long term development of a professional and 
forward-looking military and for widening the perspective of a sizable segment of the 
Armenian officer corps.  Such international contacts have also solidified Armenia’s 
diverse and expanding set of foreign military ties and relations.  
 
Since joining the NATO Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in 1996, Armenian troops 
have participated in several multinational exercises and war games.  But the main source 
  
of military training and exchange has been the Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO), a Russian-dominated security group designed to reintegrate the military forces 
of several member states of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). 12  Armenia 
is the only state in the South Caucasus to belong to the CSTO and provides the 
southernmost component in its overall air defense network. 
 
Just as the Armenian military is influenced much more by its role as a member of the 
Russian-led CSTO than its NATO ties, nearly all aspects of Armenian defense policy and 
planning is dependent on its alliance with Russia.  This relationship is rooted in the 1997 
Armenian-Russian “Friendship Treaty,” which includes a provision promising mutual 
assistance in the event of a military attack on either party.  This “Friendship Treaty” was 
bolstered in January 2003 by a new bilateral military-technical agreement that provides 
Armenia with Russia military equipment, spare parts, supplies and training.  The Russian 
military presence in Armenia is based on the 2000 bilateral agreement that allows 
Russian troops to stay in Armenia through 2025 and by a 2001 protocol that exempts 
Russia from paying rent for its military facilities in Armenia.  By contrast, Azerbaijan did 
not ratify its membership in the CIS, and instead demanded in 1992 that the Russians 
remove their approximately 62,000 troops and, by 1993, became the first former Soviet 
Republic without any Russian troops on its soil.   
 
Military, Russian troops are seen as providing an element of security for Armenia.  More 
importantly, the Russian troops provide a visible assurance of the Russian treaty 
commitment to Armenian security.  For Yerevan, the Russian presence provides a 
defensive “tripwire” that establishes a firm link to their mutual defence treaty and serves 
as a significant deterrent.  Additionally, the Russian air and air defence forces stationed in 
Armenia are seen as vital elements in the country’s national air defence.  In reality, 
however, the Russian military has assumed complete command and control authority 
over Armenian air capabilities.  The most immediate concern is the fact that Russian 
forces in Armenia are now in total control of all Armenian air defense systems and have 
consolidated their command over the entire Armenian air force.  This is a problem of 
paramount concern and must be addressed in order to ensure future military security.   
 
The Rise of Peer Competitors 
 
The armed forces of Azerbaijan remain considerably weaker and less capable than the 
Armenian military in almost all areas and continue to suffer from severe problems in 
training, equipment and morale.  The Azerbaijani armed forces are still hampered by 
corruption within the ranks and centered in the Defense Ministry, a lack of consistent and 
coordinated training programs for the individual soldier, small and larger units, and are 
especially lacking in combined arms/joint service training.  Over the past several years, 
however, the Azerbaijani military has become a better organized and more professional 
service than it was at the end of the Karabagh conflict.  
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The transformation of the Azerbaijani armed forces has been a slow and gradual process.  
Turkey has provided significant assistance to this process, stemming from a number of 
military cooperation agreements, that has included the Turkish refitting of Soviet T-72 
main battle tanks with Turkish tactical radios, a number of Turkish trainers, both on an 
individual- and team-based program, and the training of Azerbaijani officers at Turkish 
military schools and at the military academy in Ankara.  Additional improvements came 
from Azerbaijan’s active participation in NATO’s (PfP) program and other training and 
education from NATO and its member states.  The net result has been a steady education 
and exposure to Western tactics, techniques, procedures and training methods, although 
still fairly limited in scale and scope.   
 
The overall quality and readiness of much of the Azerbaijani army’s equipment remains a 
problem, however, as a decade of poor maintenance and chronic shortages of spare parts 
means that many systems are non-operational, have been cannibalized for parts, or are 
operating at less than optimal status.   Moreover, much of the older generation equipment 
is in need of systems upgrades and modernization, i.e., communication package, fire 
control and target acquisition systems, etc.  As a result, the readiness levels and 
operational capabilities vary significantly between units.    Thus, the Azerbaijani Army is 
in real need of a major maintenance transformation and systems modernization, although 
the recent military cooperation agreement with Russia includes the sale of critical spare 
parts and the provision of technical assistance to Azerbaijan.  
 
After more than a decade of neglect, Azerbaijan’s armed forces still face a number of 
daunting challenges if they are to develop into a competent military force.  Its military 
has long been under-funded and lost favor to the country’s internal security services.  At 
current funding levels, the Azerbaijani military can only afford to focus on restructuring, 
refurbishment and modernization efforts, and limited to only a few brigades at a time.  As 
it can not afford to swap out its equipment base, the priority is now on salvaging as much 
existing equipment and stock as possible and upgrade it where and when possible.   
 
The poor state of readiness of most of the Azerbaijani armed forces severely limits any 
immediate military threat to Armenia.  Over the medium- to long-term, however, the 
steady accumulation and impact of Turkish, and now U.S. military assistance and training 
will undoubtedly alter the current balance.  And Armenia must start now to prepare for 
that day.    
 
 
The Geography of Foreign Policy 
 
All nations formulate their foreign policy from a foundation of geography.  And nowhere 
is this more pronounced than in the case of Armenia.  Landlocked Armenia is situated on 
a well-worn historic crossroads between East and West.  For the past decade of blockade 
imposed by two hostile neighbors to the east and the west, the small nation of Armenia 
has sought to overcome its strategic vulnerability by formulating a complex foreign 
policy based on a geopolitical balance between competing regional powers.  The core of 
  
Armenian foreign policy is the essential pursuit of maximum flexibility, seeking 
sufficient maneuverability and securing as many policy options as possible.   
 
With an area of under 30,000 square kilometers, roughly the size of the U.S. state of 
Maryland and a population of roughly three million, this geographic vulnerability is 
compounded by a limited natural resource base, borders and terrain difficult to defend 
military, and a looming demographic crisis, all posing substantial constraints on the 
country’s economic development and physical security, and each presenting its own 
challenge. 
 
Armenia’s Foreign Policy of “Complementarity” 
 
Armenia offers an interesting model of “weak state adaptation,” stemming from an 
imperative for foreign policy adaptation and innovation.  Armenian foreign policy over 
the last decade has sought to bridge the inherently conflicting interests of Russia and the 
West, while also seeking to leverage its most significant potential asset - a significant 
Diaspora.  This foreign policy, termed “complementarity,” incorporates Armenia’s 
strategic imperative of security through a reliance on its strategic alliance with Russia and 
a positive relationship with Iran, while simultaneously conforming to the parameters of 
its Western orientation.   
 
Moreover, this policy of complementarity, although seemingly contradictory, is in fact a 
natural result of Armenia's historical and geopolitical considerations.  The strategic 
partnership with Russia is both rooted in history and necessity, especially given the 
implicit threat posed by the dual Turkish-Azerbaijani blockade of the country.  This East-
West blockade has forced Armenia to look beyond its traditional trade and export routes, 
thereby encouraging ties with Iran.  Although these inherently contradictory impulses 
have at times seemed insurmountable, the Armenian policy of complementarity offers a 
degree of regional security based on accommodating and exploiting the interests of 
traditionally competing powers. 
 
Losing the Balance of Complementarity 
 
The strategic relationship between Armenia and Russia has deepened considerably over 
the past two years, leading to serious concern over the parity of the relationship and 
trepidation over Armenia’s increasing dependence on Russia.  Many in the Armenian 
government seem increasingly determined to anchor the small nation ever firmly within 
the Russian orbit.  Complicit in this danger is a blind acceptance that Armenia has no 
choice.  This premise is also shortsighted and mistaken.  While many only see Armenia 
as safe when anchored within the Russian orbit, the implications of such a course for 
Armenian national security appears to be little considered, and certainly little debated, 
beyond the small circle of Armenia’s ruling elite.  
 
The latest examples of this trend are seen in the recent “asset-for-debts” agreements of 
2002 and 2003, a series of questionable deals granting Russia control over key strategic 
enterprises and consolidating its dominance over the country’s vulnerable economy.  
  
Russia has been able to secure, with the assent of an overly compliant Armenian 
government, control or outright ownership of much of the country’s energy network, 
including its hydroelectric plants and its sole nuclear power plant.13  
 
Aside from this outward example of the deepening of ties between Yerevan and Moscow, 
there is a more serious, and potentially harmful, aspect to the Armenian-Russian 
relationship that remains obscured by the overriding focus on Russia’s security guarantee 
for Armenia.  It is the political aspect of the Armenian-Russian relationship that presents 
a particularly understated threat to the development of democracy and the rule of law in 
Armenia.  The threat stems from the mounting reliance by Armenian political leaders on 
following the Russian model for power and governance.   
 
Emulating the Russian Political Model 
 
In what may be argued is a natural feature of the post-Soviet transition period, Armenia 
has been following the Russian political model.  Much more sophisticated under 
Vladimir Putin, this Russian model offers specific tactical lessons, including precedents 
for restraining an independent media, marginalizing the opposition, subverting the rule of 
law, and keeping the parliament powerless and ineffective.  Specifically, this Russian 
model of a strong authoritarian presidency, free of effective “checks and balances” or 
oversight, has appealed to most post-Soviet political elites.   
 
The lessons from Putin’s moves against the opposition and independent media have not 
gone unheeded in Armenia, just as attempts at meaningful constitutional reforms remain 
relatively symbolic and incomplete.  In what could be termed “good governance gone 
bad,” Armenian President Kocharian is now actively mimicking the authoritarian model 
of Russian President Vladimir Putin at the expense of his country’s infant democratic 
institutions. 
 
Over the past two years, this Armenian reliance on Russia has been significantly 
expanded and now threatens to escalate into overwhelming dependence.  This has 
contributed to a steady move away from the traditional balance of Armenia’s 
“complementarity” foreign policy of managing a pro-Western orientation while 
maintaining close security ties to Russia.  And as the trend of strongmen over statesmen 
has demonstrated, Armenia has been increasingly plagued by governance driven by 
personal interest with little consideration of national interest.   
 
An Element of Promise 
 
There is an element of promise for Armenia, however, but only if this shift from a 
balanced foreign policy can be corrected in time.  Specifically, there are two important 
trends that can offer Armenia opportunity to restore a prudent geopolitical path toward 
greater sovereignty.  These two trends stem from the new geopolitical reality of the past 
two years.  First, the course of the U.S.-Russian strategic partnership may position 
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Armenia as a pivotal state, bridging both U.S. and Russian interests in a region with 
relatively few reliable partners.  Should the convergence of interests between Washington 
and Moscow diverge over the U.S. presence in Central Asia or in reaction to a perceived 
threat from U.S. unilateral power, Armenia’s place as the sole stable state in the region 
will only invite significant U.S. efforts to check its reliance on Russia and to ensure an 
Armenian turn toward the West.   
 
A second related development stems for the shift beyond the region, as the U.S. is 
moving quickly to consolidate the architecture of its new positions in post-war Iraq.  
Armenia is potentially well positioned to accommodate any move by the U.S. to counter 
Russia, pursue an opening toward Iran, or to leverage the South Caucasus as an essential 
platform for power projection.  Thus, if the Armenian over-dependence on Russia can be 
sufficiently corrected, it will be in a position to leverage its newly enhanced strategic 
importance into greater security and reinforced sovereignty. 
 
For Armenian foreign policy, these developments must be taken into account and, where 
possible, must be both exploited when opportunities arise and managed when threats 
develop.  Fortunately, Armenia’s policy of “complementarity,” with a fundamental 
balance between strategic ally Russia and a friendly West, stands to gain from these 
developments.  Armenian foreign policy is also endowed with further strategic 
advantages stemming from the growing divide between Armenia’s increasingly stable 
democracy and the authoritarian regimes of Azerbaijan and the still fragile Georgian 
state.  This comparative advantage holds significant promise for Armenia but only if a 
prudent foreign policy can best utilize these opportunities while minimizing risks. 
 
 
Section II.  Shifting Geopolitics 
 
The still unfolding U.S. campaign against global terrorism has greatly altered the 
geopolitical landscape and, in the words of U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, has 
catapulted America into a “post-post-Cold War” period.  This abrupt shift in global 
geopolitics holds significant implications for several key regions and for the South 
Caucasus in particular.   
 
The South Caucasus and the War on Terrorism 
 
Historically the South Caucasus has always been a crossroads of empires and invaders, an 
arena for competing regional powers and, in much of the last two centuries, a pivotal 
geopolitical element in the “Great Game” of world powers.  Although traditionally 
limited to a subset of broader U.S.-Russia relations, the region has recently assumed a 
much more strategic profile with significantly greater geographic and strategic scope.  
 
Externally, the aftermath of September 11th has seen two new wars: the U.S.-led global 
“war on terrorism” and the U.S.-initiated war in Iraq.  Both have altered the course of 
international relations in general, and have forged a need for a new architecture of 
international security, in particular.  These dramatic shifts in geopolitics have profound 
  
implications for a small, landlocked country like Armenia, already subject to a disruption 
of normal trade links and transport ties.  And for the three fragile states of the South 
Caucasus, there is now a set of new challenges and opportunities stemming from the 
realignment of great power interests within the dynamics of the U.S. war on terrorism.14   
  
This shift in geopolitics stem from the U.S. global campaign against terror, a dramatically 
evolving new U.S-Russian strategic relationship, and from several new areas of U.S. 
engagement.  It is this U.S-Russian partnership, however, that holds the most significant 
repercussions for the South Caucasus.  This new post-September 11th geopolitical reality 
in the South Caucasus is no longer defined by the traditional zero-sum game between the 
U.S. and Russia and holds promise that the past decade’s policies of energy development 
in the region may foster greater regional integration, stability and conflict resolution.  
Specifically, the last decade’s record of exclusionary policies favoring energy 
development and transport in Azerbaijan and Georgia, while assenting to the isolation 
and blockade of Armenia, has only contributed to the exacerbation of regional conflicts 
and a further widening in regional integration.  
 
Armenia and the Longer-Term U.S. National Interest 
 
There is a degree of opportunity for Armenia resulting from the new direction of U.S. 
policy and national interest in the region.  Specifically, there is an opportunity for an even 
greater Armenian strategic value offered by the new relationship between the U.S. and 
Russia, the shifts in the geopolitics of the region (including the new U.S. role in Georgia, 
its commitments in Iraq, and the lessening of Turkey’s role as U.S. proxy power), and by 
the disparity between Armenia and an authoritarian Azerbaijani regime.  There are two 
main trajectories at play in the longer-term U.S. national interest that should be noted, 
including: 
      
• a broadening of the U.S.-Russian partnership to contain China, with cooperation 
driven by shared security concerns of instability in Central Asia and the strategic 
aim to buffer Chinese expansion and power projection; 
 
• a shared need to secure the South Caucasus as a “security belt” for Iraq, Russia 
and Central Asia, and the Middle East, and to foster the region as a key platform 
for the southward containment of rogue states in the Middle Eastern theater and 
for the northward bulwark against Russian insecurity in the North Caucasus. 
 
The “War on Terrorism” does hold a degree of negative implications, however. There is a 
dangerous trend of promoting and preferring authoritarian regimes over democratic 
governments as more effective and more attractive partners in the war on terrorism.  Such 
a danger must also be overcome by the adoption of a more balanced overall policy 
toward the region.  And with the emergence of an ever strengthening Armenian 
democratic partner, endowed with the potential as a strategic bridge to Iran, the U.S. may 
find Armenia as a most valuable ally in an increasingly significant region.    
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Implications for Nagorno Karabagh 
 
Although the current geopolitical reality offers Armenia an opportunity to garner an 
enhanced strategic leverage, one notable implication of the new U.S.-Russian relationship 
may be a lessening of Russian support for Armenia in favor of improving relations with 
Azerbaijan, and a possible shift in the traditional Russian position regarding the Nagorno 
Karabagh conflict.  Such a shift in Russian policy regarding Nagorno Karabagh was 
already evident during this past year of diplomatic initiatives and mediation by the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the primary international 
body seeking to broker a resolution to the conflict.   
 
Signs of such a Russian policy shift were first evident in its approach to the Paris summit 
meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders brokered by French President 
Jacques Chirac in March 2001.  By April of that year, public signs of a “more 
cooperative” Russian diplomacy were cited during the U.S. hosting of a “Camp David” 
style meeting between the Armenian and Azerbaijani presidents in Key West, Florida.  It 
was also at the Key West summit where the U.S. Department of State pursued a limited 
opening to Iran, seeking to involve Iran in the process and openly announcing that Iran 
would be briefed on the course of the OSCE mediation effort.  This was also a prudent 
tactic to prevent any temptation by Iran to adopt a “spoiler” role by sabotaging the 
delicate mediation effort.   
 
The dynamic course of the new U.S.-Russian relationship has undoubtedly moved 
beyond the parameters of the region, and may very well forge a new Russian role within 
the “near abroad” in the form of a strategic division of Eurasia, redrawing the Caspian 
and Central Asian regions into basic burden-sharing spheres of influence.  Such a 
development suggests that Moscow may join Washington in a new attempt to restart their 
mediation of the Nagorno Karabagh conflict by launching a more cooperative effort 
aimed at applying more pressure on the Armenian side seeking greater concessions.  Such 
concessions were already demanded during the Key West summit, adding the issue of a 
“land bridge” transiting Armenian territory connecting Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan 
exclave bordering Turkey.  The issues of conflict resolution and even concessions in the 
Nagorno Karabagh case remain hindered, however, by the Azerbaijani refusal to 
negotiate with Karabagh, the only true partner capable of guaranteeing a lasting 
settlement to the conflict.    
 
U.S. Military Engagement 
 
As already clearly evident today, the U.S. war on terrorism has also resulted in a number 
of modifications in U.S. security policy toward a number of nations.  These modifications 
in policy affected a wide-ranging set of diverse and often disparate nations, including 
traditional foes, such as China and Russia, traditional allies like Turkey and Saudi Arabia, 
and new partners, such as Pakistan and Poland.   
 
  
The new security environments in Central Asia and the South Caucasus also demonstrate 
a shift in U.S. security policy.  Both regions offer the U.S. important roles as platforms 
for power projection, from Central Asia into Afghanistan and, at least potentially, from 
the Caucasus into the northern Middle East (most notably into Iran).  But it was Central 
Asia that benefited most, and first, from the shift in U.S. security as Uzbekistan, and to a 
lesser degree Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan abruptly emerged as key frontline 
partners in the U.S. war on terrorism and served as crucial platforms for the combat 
operations targeting the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.   
 
Although the U.S. was generally engaged in the region since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, the three nations of the Southern Caucasus acquired a new and enhanced 
geostrategic importance to Washington in the new realm of post-September 11th security.  
Although there was, and continues to be, a significant role for the smaller Southern 
Caucasus states in the U.S. “war on terrorism,” their active contributions to the effort is 
far less important than those of the Central Asian states and consists primarily of limited 
counter-terrorism training, through “train and equip” missions in Georgia, and greater 
military assistance for border security and counter-proliferation in Azerbaijan.   
 
The NATO Alliance and the South Caucasus 
 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is an “alliance in transition,” refining its 
mission and passing through an important evolution.  Particularly in the post-9/11 world, 
the very foundation for the NATO alliance, its mission and mandate, have been subject to 
dramatic shifts in global security and geopolitics.  This transition was most evident at the 
2004 Istanbul summit, where new concerns, centered largely on the future direction and 
destiny of the NATO alliance, included consideration of a new expanded role in the 
South Caucasus that stems from “its new mission-defined offense and no longer from its 
geography-based defense.”15
 
The NATO engagement in the South Caucasus is much more than a straightforward 
recognition of the region’s strategic significance, and is not limited to the region alone, 
but is tied to the Middle East, in a North-South axis, with a focus on Azerbaijani-Iranian 
relations, and linked to Turkey and Central Asia, in an East-West axis.  The NATO 
agenda for the region, and for the three states in particular, differs from the alliance’s 
individual relations with Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, however.  There has also 
been a demotion of NATO as the primary instrument of Western security, as it has been 
largely replaced by a network of U.S.-led bilateral security arrangements.  This change 
was most clearly seen in the case of Turkey, but not by the U.S. advocacy for Turkish 
membership in the Europe Union (EU).  Rather, the change is evident in the shift in the 
U.S. recognition of Turkey as a strategic partner from the decades-long mantra of “loyal 
NATO ally” to a much more limited role outside of the NATO context.   
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This shift has modified Turkey’s strategic value from its role as NATO’s sole Islamic 
member to its potential as the EU’s only Islamic state.  This is essential to the Bush 
Administration in order to supplement its greater “democratization campaign” in the 
Middle East, by presenting the Turkish model not as a secular state in the Middle East, 
but more as an Islamic state integrated within a Western, democratic Europe.  This would 
aid the U.S. campaign in terms of ideological purity, by arguing that the approach is not 
directed against Islam, and in terms of geographic proximity, with Turkey extending the 
EU’s borders to Iraq, Iran and Syria.  A secondary benefit for some in Washington rests 
with a Turkey within the EU, and as its largest member, through its potential to seriously 
dilute the power and effectiveness of the EU, or of the French and German power of “Old 
Europe” more specifically.                    
 
Georgia as the “Center of Gravity” 
 
Moreover, the NATO engagement in the South Caucasus must also be understood to 
reflect and support the “second track” of direct U.S. military engagement, as seen by the 
Georgian “Train & Equip” (GTEP) model and by the more recent Caspian initiative with 
Azerbaijan.  For both NATO and the U.S. military, however, Georgia is the “center of 
gravity” or fulcrum for both stability and security in the region.  In terms of engagement, 
there is a secondary desire by some in NATO to threaten Armenia with complete 
isolation, by virtue of its “over-dependence” on Russia.   
 
For the new Georgian leadership, and its ongoing effort to rebuild and restore the 
Georgian state, NATO engagement provides a new political/geopolitical context of much 
greater depth than the past strategic focus on energy.  With the opportunities inherent in 
NATO and U.S. military attention, Georgia stands to gain much more than from the 
rather limited returns of a “transit state.”  And that difference is the key to elevating 
Georgia from the status of “failed state.”  This is also evident in the Georgian tactics in 
dealing with first, Ajaria, and then Ossetia and now Abkhazia.  These tactics involve a 
fairly sophisticated approach of “carrot and stick,” with a strong dose of military threat 
and posturing, coupled with “psychological warfare” (PSYOP).  But the important lesson 
is that Russia matters most for Georgia, as Russia is close and will always be close, while 
the U.S. is far away and will always be far away. 
 
Despite a degree of expectation and exhortation, the NATO summit’s handling of the 
next stage of alliance enlargement was generally disappointing to many.  Although the 
summit cited Albania, Croatia and Macedonia as promising aspirants, both Azerbaijan 
and Georgia were shunned as potential NATO aspirants.  By recognizing the states of the 
“strategically important region” of the South Caucasus as security partners, rather than as 
potential members, NATO seemed to be indicating that the course of NATO engagement 
in both the South Caucasus, and Central Asia, will be more conditional on Russian 
interests.   
 
This also suggests that the overriding concern over the current campaign of state 
restoration in Georgia and the sensitive presence of U.S. bases in Central Asia have 
fostered an approach aimed at accommodating, rather than exacerbating, traditional 
  
Russian security concerns.  The most significant lesson from NATO engagement, 
therefore, is that the security needs of the three states of the South Caucasus must be met 
first by the states themselves, as any reliance on external sources for their security may be 
both remote and unrealistic.        
 
 
Section III.  National Security Imperatives 
 
Among the external imperatives driving Armenian national security, the security and 
status of Nagorno Karabagh and the challenge of relations with Azerbaijan remain the 
primary concerns.  But another important imperative relates to developments in the 
Armenian region of Javakhk in southern Georgia.  And central to the question of Javakhk 
is the state of overall bilateral relations between Armenia and Georgia, complicated by 
the clear strategic implications of Armenian dependence on Georgian territory as a transit 
route to Russia.   
 
Imperative One: Nagorno Karabagh 
 
There are four main drivers in the pursuit of security and viability of Karabagh: 
 
• State/Nation Building: the ongoing effort to forge greater economic self-
sufficiency and political/diplomatic sustainability of Nagorno Karabagh stands at 
a crossroads of strategic choice: to accelerate a drive for outright independence or 
to pursue unification with the Republic of Armenia.  Each strategy offers its own 
benefits and disadvantages, yet the underlying tenet consists not of the ultimate 
outcome but more of how to resolve the Karabagh question.  Karabagh is still 
very much a mere “proto-state” with limited sustainability and little real strategic 
value beyond Armenia.  Although the precedents of newly emerging nations of 
East Timor and Kosovo suggest that the fundamental conflict between territorial 
integrity and self-determination has shifted, the real issue is one of a shift in the 
concept of sovereignty; 
 
• Sovereignty: on an international level, the very concept of sovereignty has shifted 
significantly in recent years.  There are also several innovative case studies that 
offer suggestions for the Karabagh mediation process.   These include the cases of 
Gibraltar, Kaliningrad, and other examples of post-colonial rule and rights.  The 
essential priority for Karabagh, however, is one of security, with sovereignty now 
constituting an elastic step in the overall mediation process;  
 
• OSCE Peace Process: there continues to be a widespread lack of understanding 
of the international mediation process in terms of both Armenian and Azerbaijani 
public opinion.  Yet the main obstacle continues to be Azerbaijan’s refusal to 
recognize and include the democratically elected government of Nagorno 
Karabagh  in the peace process; 
 
  
• Post-Conflict Settlement: there must be greater preparation to address the 
important issues that will arise in the next stage of the peace process: issues of 
security, peacekeepers, ending the Turkish-Azerbaijani blockade, refugees, etc.  
 
The Nagorno Karabagh issue has expanded since its military inception in 1988 to emerge 
as one of the most significant post-Soviet conflicts, particularly given its inherent nature 
whereby the political and diplomatic challenges of balancing the principles of territorial 
integrity and the right to national self-determination require prudent solutions in order for 
the conflict to be fairly resolved.  The Karabagh conflict has long been misunderstood 
and incorrectly presented as simply an “ancient hatred” or “historical conflict” that 
erupted in the wake of the imploding Soviet Union.  The issue is far more complex, 
however, and the generalizations and stereotypes of the conflict only hinder progress in 
resolving the dispute.  Specifically, the Karabagh conflict has been interpreted in three 
different ways.  The first and most commonly held approach, is to define the issue by a 
focus on the role of extreme nationalism stemming from “ancient hatred” in driving the 
ethnic violence.  A second approach is the suggestion that the conflict stems from a series 
of inter-ethnic security dilemmas. 16  The third approach sees manipulation by belligerent 
leaders as the key cause for the conflict. 
 
The Challenge of Security 
 
The fundamental issue of the Karabagh conflict is the existence of a significant “security 
dilemma,” whereby the Armenians of Karabagh were driven by the fears of mass 
extinction, compounded by the realization of a total lack of any state guarantees of safety.  
The pogroms of Baku and the organized violence of Sumgait directed against the 
Armenian minority demonstrated the insecurity of the Armenian population residing 
within Azerbaijan.  The outbreak of anti-Armenian violence in Azerbaijan fed the already 
present sociological insecurity of Armenians stemming from the 1915 Armenian 
Genocide perpetrated by neighboring Turkey.17  The preconditions of the conflict, 
following a pattern found in most incidents of ethnic violence, included a series of 
ethnically-defined grievances, negative ethnic stereotypes, and disputes over emotional 
symbols (land, churches, etc).  Other factors necessary to raise the danger of actual 
violence were present as well.  These included a sincere fear of mass extinction and a 
threat of demographic expulsion, both demonstrated in actions by the Azerbaijani side in 
a pattern of state policy.  The security dilemma of the Karabagh Armenians became 
firmly rooted during the de facto anarchy associated with the decline and eventual 
collapse of the Soviet system.    
 
The Limits of International Mediation 
 
Aside from the inherent obstacle of oversimplifying the core of the conflict, international 
mediation attempts seeking to foster a negotiated settlement to the Karabagh conflict face 
additional constraints, both as a result of the mediators’ strategy and from several 
                                                 
16   First articulated by Posen, Barry R., 1993, “The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict,” Survival, Vol. 
35, No. 1, 27-47. 
17   Kaufman, Stuart J., (1996), “Spiraling to Ethnic War,” International Security, Vol. 21, No. 2, 116. 
  
important external factors.  Initial approaches to the Karabagh conflict (and to other 
global crises as well) rested on the premise that the post-Cold War era offered new 
opportunities for the world powers to intervene on a global level to mitigate, mediate and 
help resolve ethnic conflicts.  This premise of a “new world order” hoped that an external 
enforcement of agreements between warring parties would lead to a new period of 
stability in conflict-prone areas.  It was in this optimistic initial period that the United 
States began to exert a dominant role in the Middle East peace negotiations, and joined 
the European powers in attempting to resolve the bloody conflict in the former 
Yugoslavia.  Very soon into this initial period, however, it became evident that the new 
post-Cold War period deprived the great powers of the political will necessary for such 
international commitments. 
 
The fundamental test for international mediation is the depth and fortitude of the 
international community's commitment.  For example, the external guarantees vital to any 
lasting negotiated settlement in conflict resolution can only be effective if the parties to 
the conflict believe in the political will of the outside powers to fairly enforce the 
settlement for an indefinite period.  The stamina of external enforcement is, therefore, 
crucial to the overall effectiveness of the settlement.18  By noting this fact in examining 
the Karabagh issue, it also becomes apparent that even intervening countries with vested 
interests in reaching a solution, such as the case with the world powers attracted to the 
significant oil reserves in Azerbaijan, are hampered by an inability to offer credible 
external guarantees.  An additional complication to the effectiveness of outside powers in 
conflict mediation is the very fact of their vested interests.  In this case, these powers 
must overcome the distrust of the Karabagh leadership regarding their investments and 
interests in Azerbaijani oil.  Another example of this complication was seen in France’s 
doomed attempt at intervening in the ethnic conflict of Rwanda in 1994, where the 
French were seen to be partisan by the combatants and/or were partisan because of their 
vested interests in the outcome of the conflict. 
 
Countries with weak interests in the conflict, on the other hand, are commonly perceived 
as lacking the political will to offer credible guarantees to the parties.  This case was most 
evident in the failed role of the United States in Somalia as the first loss of U.S. lives in 
enforcing the peace was enough for Washington to immediately withdraw.  This also 
relates to the danger of weak commitments leading to ambiguous policy, a scenario that 
tended to only exacerbate the hostilities in the former Yugoslavia, for example, and has 
broadly defined the weakness of U.S. policy in the Balkans.  The notable exception, 
however, is posed by the NATO campaign in Kosovo which also offered a new precedent 
for promoting the right of self-determination over the previously-held defense of national 
sovereignty, a principle which guards an inherent concept of territorial integrity.  This 
seemingly contradictory clash of the principles of self-determination and national 
sovereignty reflected in the Kosovo scenario, however, is not without the same 
constraints of the test of political will.  In fact, the very nature of the Kosovo model 
demanded an even greater level of political will by states involved in order to surmount 
the shield of national sovereignty.  The Karabagh leadership seems to understand this 
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only too well as demonstrated by its frustration with the lack of true security guarantees 
and its exclusion from the peace process of the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). 
 
Self-Determination versus Sovereignty 
 
As mentioned above, the rather ambiguous nature of the Karabagh conflict in terms of 
civil war or inter-state war calls for an examination of the Azerbaijani claim of territorial 
integrity or sovereignty.   Although it seems boldly biased to dismiss the Azerbaijani 
position outright, the very principle of sovereignty itself is not as widely held or as 
strongly defended as often thought.  States have a long history of intervention and 
involvement in the ethnic affairs of others.19  And most obvious to the Armenians, most 
of the international treaties settling European affairs at the end of World War I contained 
empty and unenforced provisions and obligations of signatory states protecting minority 
rights.  Moreover, as former United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Ghali has 
admitted, “the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed.” 20
 
Conclusion 
 
The two fundamental obstacles to an effective resolution to the Karabagh conflict are the 
Azerbaijani refusal to engage the Karabagh leadership in direct talks, insisting that any 
such engagement would infer recognition of Karabagh’s independence, and the lack of 
real security guarantees by the international community, ensuring continued skepticism 
on the part of Karabagh.  The Azerbaijani refusal to conduct direct talks with Karabagh 
has not been adequately challenged by the OSCE, despite the significant precedents 
offered in the cases of the United Nations-brokered talks featuring Georgian and 
Abkhazian delegations and, in another example, between Greek and Turkish Cypriot 
parties engaged in direct negotiations.  The second obstacle, the lack of any firm security 
guarantees for Karabagh, is much more daunting, however, as the very credibility of any 
mediation effort rests on the necessity for the enforcement of any concluding agreement 
by the international community. 
 
Imperative Two: Javakhk 
 
The peaceful political transition in Georgia that began in late 2003 marked the beginning 
of a new effort to restore state authority and regain legitimacy in the wake of over a 
decade of civil war, separatist conflict and severe economic decline.  In what became 
known as Georgia’s “Rose Revolution,” former Soviet-era leader Eduard Shevardnadze 
was forced from the presidency and replaced by a new, young Western-educated 
reformist former Justice Minister, Mikhail Saakashvili, in democratic elections in January 
2004.   
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Sparked by popular outrage over obviously fraudulent parliamentary elections, the 
opposition National Movement led by Saakashvili was able to force President Eduard 
Shevardnadze to resign in November 2003.  Yet the apparent ease of forcefully ending 
the rule of Shevardnadze and garnering a sweeping victory in the subsequent presidential 
election was not without its own difficulties, as the new Georgian president continues to 
struggle with the legacy of a failed state.   
 
Most significantly, the new Georgian leader has inherited the very same problems of the 
old regime, ranging from institutionalized corruption to a pronounced loss of territorial 
control over several key areas of the country that seriously limited his authority and 
legitimacy.  He also faces a rather new problem stemming from the wave of popular 
support that swept him into office.  With the initial success of ousting the Shevardnadze 
regime, this popular support was quickly transformed into a population endowed with 
“great expectations,” with popular demands for economic improvement and immediate 
benefits.  Faced with these twin challenges, the new Georgian leader has acted quickly.  
Bolstered by this new electoral legitimacy and riding a wave of popular support, 
President Saakashvili embarked on a challenging campaign of state-building, seeking to 
rescue Georgia from its nearly fatal crisis as a “failed” or “failing” state.   
 
This effort to restore the Georgian state consists of two essential elements, each of which 
represents essential steps to security and stability.  The first element, internal in nature, is 
the need to repair and remake relations between the central Georgian government and its 
separatist and autonomous regions and republics.  The complex nature of the conflicts 
between the central Georgian government and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia is truly daunting, and is only exacerbated by the external pressure imposed 
by Russian interests.  But as the Georgian government must craft an incentive for these 
regions and republics to return to Georgian rule, the lack of economic and political 
incentives offers limited optimism for a peaceful resolution, especially as the military 
approach remains beyond Georgia’s capabilities.  
 
The second element in this strategy is external, and relates to the necessity for improved 
Georgian relations with Russia.  With the steady reassertion of Russian influence in the 
South Caucasus in recent years, Georgia remains significantly vulnerable to Russian 
pressure and economic leverage.  This Russian leverage over Georgia has also expanded 
in recent years, from military and political leverage exercised through the unresolved 
conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia to a more sophisticated and effective tool of 
controlling the Georgian energy sector. 
 
Despite the dramatic changes underway in Georgia since late 2003, there has been 
increasing concern over the worsening situation in the Samtskhe-Javakheti region of 
Georgia, a strategically located region of southern Georgia with an ethnic-Armenian 
majority population.  The strategic significance of Javakhk stems from its pivotal role in 
the long term security and stability of Georgia.  Specifically, it is the severe economic 
conditions and poverty of the Javakhk region that challenges both national and regional 
stability and greatly influences bilateral relations between Armenia and Georgia, as well 
as relations with Russia by virtue of the large Russian military base in the region.   
  
 
Economic Neglect & Underdevelopment 
 
The majority Armenian population of Javakhk has faced a crisis of mounting severity in 
recent years.  Over a decade of economic neglect and underdevelopment by the central 
Georgian government has resulted in substantial poverty and unemployment.  
Additionally, energy shortages continue to plague the region, and basic social services 
such as education and health care remain strained beyond the region’s capabilities, 
leading to a severe crisis in Javakhk.   
 
The fundamental nature of the problem of Javakhk is economic, with a serious degree of 
insecurity and vulnerability.  For decades, Javakhk was the most underdeveloped region 
of Georgia and since its independence, a combination of irresponsible economic policies, 
state mismanagement and governmental neglect has resulted in a pronounced state of 
decline, most evident in the decay and disrepair of the regional infrastructure, and the 
poor state of the labor market as the region has recorded over a decade of net job loss and 
labor migration.  The Javakhk region also continues to be afflicted with one of the highest 
unemployment rates of the country, the lowest level of state investment, and 
proportionally, the highest outflows of seasonal migration.  
 
Local industry is virtually nonexistent in Javakhk, aside from the service industry 
affiliated with the local Russian base.  For Javakhk residents not fortunate enough to have 
work associated with the local Russian military base, labor conditions force much of the 
male population to seasonally migrate to Russia in search of work, only returning to their 
families in winter.  The most vulnerable of the population, the elderly, are forced to rely 
on such family support in the absence of reliable pension benefits or even basic health 
care and social services.  During the peak months of work in Russia, seasonal workers 
remit an estimated $25,000 a day in transfers to families in Javakhk.    
 
Roads and highways continue to be in severe need of investment and reconstruction, as 
the only improvement in transport in the past ten years has been on the Armenian side of 
the border.  The normal two-hour trip from Ninotsminda to Tbilisi, for example, takes six 
to seven hours due to the poor conditions of the main road.  In fact, almost all of 
Javakhk’s roads and external trade routes are southward toward Armenia, further 
strengthening the ties between Javakhk and Armenia.  This isolation from the rest of 
Georgia is another key element of the region’s difficult relationship with the central 
Georgian government, but it is the economic crisis and deepening poverty in Javakhk that 
has contributed the most to the region’s vulnerability and isolation. 
 
The Economic Crisis in Javakhk 
 
Several indicators reveal the extent of the economic crisis in Javakhk: 
 
? The Javakhk regional economy produces only one-tenth of national average 
? 70% of the Javakhk population are living in poverty 
  
? 90% of the Javakhk population is forced to spend 65% of their income on food 
(although it has the highest national ratio of money spent on books) 
? 60% unemployment rate 
? Little private business, only 6.3% of workers are self-employed 
? Little investment, no Western investment (ever)  
 
 
The Armenian Identity of Javakhk 
 
National identity in Javakhk is strongly Armenian, and is plainly evident in most aspects 
of everyday life.  Although three languages, Armenian, Georgian and Russian, are seen in 
the street signs throughout the region, the Georgian presence virtually ends there.  
Armenian television programs, not Georgian, are watched in Javakhk due to both easier 
reception and popular preference.  The Russian ruble, the Armenian dram, and to a lesser 
extent, the American dollar, are the only forms of currency to be found in Javakhk.   
 
Although Javakhk is nominally a region of Georgia, more than 95 percent of the Javakhk 
Armenians cannot speak Georgian well.  Javakhk is much more Armenian than Georgian 
and this national identity is firmly rooted in its history and manifested in many, if not all, 
of Javakhk’s characteristics.  The relative physical isolation of Javakhk, combined with 
the unofficial cultural autonomy of the region, has reinforced this strongly Armenian 
identity despite being under Georgian rule.  
 
Georgian-Armenian Relations 
 
Throughout the last decade, Armenia has sought to maintain a cooperative relationship 
with Georgia as the severe restraints imposed on Armenia by the dual blockade of the 
landlocked country by Azerbaijan from the east and Turkey from the west made the 
outlet to the north through Georgia a vital necessity.  The Azerbaijani and Turkish 
blockade of Armenia’s railway and transport links, their disruption of the regional energy 
network and the breakdown of communications links all contributed to a serious 
Armenian dependence on Georgia for all essential commodities.  
 
These constraints on Armenian foreign policy regarding Georgia have greatly influenced 
Armenian policy on Javakhk, and have generally limited it to a secondary role.  When 
circumstances have provided an opportunity, however, Armenia has been able to offset 
these constraints, as seen by Georgia’s need for supplies of Armenian electricity.  With 
an energy crisis worsening over the past year due to Russian manipulation of its energy 
shipments, the two governments have concluded new bilateral accords whereby Armenia 
exports supplies of electricity to Georgia.  Additionally, there is a significant Armenian 
role in providing direct assistance to Javakhk in the educational sector.  
 
Most importantly, this arrangement included the modernization of the 35,000-kilowatt 
Ashotsk-Ninotsiminda-Akhalkalaki electrical power line by Armenia, an element that 
allows Armenia to supply electricity directly to Javakhk without connecting to the main 
Georgian national energy grid.  Although some outstanding issues remain regarding the 
  
Armenian-Javakhk energy deal, it allows Armenia to directly meet an important need of 
the Javakhk population and sets an important precedent in establishing a special 
Armenian role in assisting Javakhk. 
 
The Russian Base at Akhalkalaki 
 
Overlooking the heart of Javakhk from its perch high on a cliff, the Russian military base 
at Akhalkalaki is seen by the Javakhk population as much more than a straightforward 
guarantor of physical security.  The Russian military presence in Javakhk is both a 
strategic deterrent and a central element of the Javakhk economy.  The Russian base is 
the region’s largest source of employment and provides a reliable income from work both 
directly and indirectly tied to the base for several thousand local Armenians.   
 
In terms of providing physical security, the Russian military presence in the region, first 
established in 1828, provides the Javakhk Armenians with its only tangible reassurance in 
the face of the population's fear of Turkish aggression.  With a border with Turkey twice 
as long as with Armenia, Javakhk is quite vulnerable to any potential Turkish military 
assault.  The Russian military presence, therefore, also meets the security concerns of the 
population as a strategic defense against the Turkish threat.  The perception of a threat 
from neighboring Turkey stems from history but is also reinforced by the increasing 
Turkish military role in Georgia in the past few years.  The proximity of Turkey means a 
military assault would only have to penetrate 20 miles into Javakhk to capture the heart 
of the region.  The natural vulnerability of Javakhk as a border region is also a constant 
reminder of insecurity in the face of such a threat. 
 
The 62nd Divisional Russian base at Akhalkalaki, with its force of 3000 soldiers, is home 
to the Russian 147th Motorized Rifle Division.  It is also the largest, and only reliable, 
source of employment in Javakhk.  The base provides jobs for several thousand local 
Armenians, offers the local workers access to affordable and efficient health care and 
includes the operation of a 500-person factory on the grounds of the base. 21  Some 
estimates also reveal that nearly half of the region’s population is engaged in work related 
to providing goods and services to the base, a fact of obvious importance to the struggling 
Javakhk economy and its high unemployment rate.  Nearly half of the 3000 Russian 
soldiers, both officers and enlisted men, stationed at the base are in fact local Armenian 
Javakhk residents.   
 
Insecurity and Vulnerability 
 
The insecurity and vulnerability of the Armenians of Javakhk is further exacerbated by 
the region’s strategic location.  Javakhk is pivotal to the route for oil and natural gas 
pipelines transporting Azerbaijani energy through Georgian territory.  The newly 
constructed $3 billion Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline, for example, passes through three of the 
six districts of Samtskhe-Javakheti, accounting for roughly 38 percent of the Georgian 
section of the planned route.  Specifically, the pipeline enters the Gardabani district, 
                                                 
21   Income from economic activity and indirect labor associated with the Russian base is estimated at 
roughly $80,000 a month. 
  
traverses Rustavi at the north, crosses the northern parts of Tetri Tskaro and Tsalka 
districts, passes through the Borjomi district southern of the Borjomi town, and transits 
the Akhaltsikhe district, before crossing the Georgian-Turkish border near Vale (see 
below). 
   
 
 
The South Caucasus Energy Corridor: The Baku-Ceyhan Route 
 
There are several implications for Javakhk stemming from the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline 
plan.  First, the presence of the pipeline and its proximity to the Armenians of Javakhk 
may invite an even greater Turkish military threat, under the guise of providing “pipeline 
security.”  It also threatens the local and regional environment, with serious repercussions 
for the biodiversity and underground water springs of Javakhk.  Third, it tends to 
encourage stricter Georgian political control and may increase corruption in the region. 
 
Additionally, there is a significant threat perception rooted in Turkey’s increasingly 
assertive and ambitious plan to extend its military influence in Georgia.  Through a multi-
million dollar military assistance program, Turkey has forged a significant geopolitical 
presence in the region.  Georgia has become seriously dependent on the Turkish military 
and the structural dependence of the Georgian armed forces has only exacerbated an 
already marked decline in the authority and power of the central Georgian state. 
 
A related factor contributing to the insecurity of the region is the issue of the Meskhetian 
Turks.  Prior to their World War II deportation by Soviet Premier Joseph Stalin, the 
Meskhetian Turks resided in the district of Meskhetia adjoining Javakheti.  The district 
itself was ceded to Georgia by the Adrianople peace treaty between Russia and Turkey 
and the Meskhetian Turks have always considered themselves as ethnic Turks, continuing 
to more closely identify themselves with Turkey than with Georgia proper.  Following 
their deportation to Central Asia, their native lands in the district were repopulated by 
settlements of Armenians, Georgians, and to a lesser degree, by Russians.  But with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union, the Meskhetian Turks have renewed their demands to return 
to their ancestral homes in southern Georgia.  An influx of Meskhetian Turks would 
  
significantly alter the already delicate demography of the region and would only 
exacerbate tensions.  The issue could also conceivably arouse a renewed Turkish claim to 
the territory, making the implications severe for the future of the nearby Armenians. 
 
Javakhk within Georgia: The Need for Autonomy 
 
The trend of devolution of power from the central state to the increasingly assertive 
autonomous regions and republics underway in Georgia is determining the future of 
Georgian statehood.  It has become apparent that Georgia is on a course toward 
reconstituting its statehood and transforming itself into a confederation.  For Javakhk, the 
most attractive path toward security and greater potential for economic development is 
autonomy within a new Georgia.   
 
There is also a set of potential economic benefits to be realized through an autonomous 
Javakhk.  The most realistic of these benefits include the possible share of proceeds from 
the lease agreement for the Russian military base in Javakhk currently being negotiated 
between Tbilisi and Moscow.  A second benefit lies in the promise of a new revenue 
sharing plan derived from transit fees from the utilization of Javakhk territory for the 
Baku-Ceyhan pipeline or in from the Tbilisi-Kars railway.  There are some precedents for 
an autonomous region negotiating a share of transit fees in this way, as the Ajarians are 
paid for the use of their Black Sea port Poti or as the Chechen government has received 
tariff payments for the pipeline from Baku through Chechnya to the Russian port 
facilities on the Black Sea.  Even more encouraging would be the possibility of utilizing 
such revenue in a special “Javakhk Development Fund” to be administered by the 
regional government of an autonomous Javakhk and with the bilateral assistance and 
supervision of both Armenia and Georgia.    
 
By following this course of Georgia's devolution toward confederation, an autonomous 
Javakhk, at this time, represents the most prudent and most promising avenue for 
securing the rights and meeting the needs of the majority Armenian population.  With the 
opportunity for security and the promise of stability through autonomy, Javakhk may be 
allowed to begin to effectively overcome its legacy of economic neglect and 
underdevelopment.  An autonomous Javakhk region would also play an important role as 
a precedent for the incentives needed for the breakaway autonomous regions and 
republics to join a new, reconstituted Georgian confederation.  Thus, Javakhk may be a 
most effective tool in bolstering the effort to reforge the Georgian state. 
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